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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Crisis management, cadre lists, and the Security Council 
Events on the political front in Russia have begun to move at a quickening pace, 
whether as a result of a deepening divide in the diarchy, or more likely, as a 
result of concerted policy to address not only the economic, but political effects of 
the international financial crisis.  Earlier this week, Russian President Dmitri 
Medvedev announced the dismissals of three regional leaders in Russia:  the 
governors of Pskov, Orel, and of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.  The governor 
of Voronezh, whose term expires in March, is to be replaced by the current 
Agriculture Minister, Aleksei Gordeyev. (1)  The move served to spotlight 
Medvedev's apparent campaign to reinvigorate state bureaucratic structures by 
creating a list of "reserves" or individuals vetted by a team of advisers to serve in 
the state apparat.  
 
According to the Kremlin's announcement, "The candidates on the list must be 
between 25 and 50, have a university degree, and possess such qualities as 
managerial ability, competence, effectiveness and a capacity for strategic 
thinking." The list is meant to be remarkably comprehensive: "The high-potential 
managers will be organised in groups on three levels: there will be a thousand 
people at the presidential level, of which a hundred names have been published, 
a federal pool (approximately 5 thousand people) and a regional group, in which 
there are currently approximately 16 thousand people." (2)  
 
At least the presidential element of the list was compiled by a team of 172 
advisers, who vetted the candidates.  It is clear that most, if not all, of the 
individuals on the "Top 100" list that has been published already, received 
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advance notice of their candidacy.  This suggests that the process, while perhaps 
carried out quietly, clearly was not secret.  According to the Kremlin, the 
compilation of the list was the result of a July 2008 presidential decree on 
management personnel. (3) 
 
Medvedev's personnel moves this week are notable, first for the scope of the 
potential apparat shuffle that may result from a "cleansing" of the current 
gubernatorial and administrative ranks.  While there is some speculation that the 
creation of the reserve lists represents an attempt to release the grip of Putin's 
siloviki from several key slots, it is unlikely that this "rotation of personnel" will 
effect either the higher levels of government offices, where the leaders of the 
siloviki clan operate, nor will it have a significant impact on the closest assets in 
their valued patronage tails.  At best, this "rotation" will serve to remove 
secondary and tertiary cadres and replace them, quite possibly, with an evenly 
scattered representation of the current clans.  The part of the procedure that 
involved nomination, vetting, and discussion with the candidates themselves, 
suggests that the process was open enough to be influenced by the current 
arrangement of forces within the elite, and will, therefore, likely present a similar 
reflection of the present order. 
 
Perhaps the most remarkable moment in the personnel shake up this week 
occurred in President Medvedev's decision to remove (many suggest demote) 
Agricultural Minister Aleksei Gordeyev to the position of Governor of Voronezh.  
(4)  This appears to be the first attempt by President Medvedev to manipulate the 
personnel of prime minister Putin's cabinet.  While the president clearly has 
power of approval over the appointment of ministers to the Russian government, 
it seemed unlikely, when Vladimir Putin assumed the position of Prime Minister, 
that Medvedev would be able to exercise authority over dismissals from a sitting 
cabinet.  This single personnel choice indeed may represent a tilt in the balance 
of power between prime minister and president.  Or, perhaps, it is simply the 
execution of a decision agreed to earlier. 
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Medvedev's high profile personnel shuffles and the fanfare given his 
announcement of the creation of a personnel reserve list also may represent the 
culmination of policy decisions agreed between president and prime minister in a 
forum that received less attention.  It seems likely that Medvedev and Putin 
would coordinate actions, particularly in response to the current economic crisis.  
It also seems quite possible that the current economic difficulties have presented 
concerns outside of the realm of economics alone. 
 
There has been a great deal of speculation that under the Putin regime, a social 
contract developed in Russia that, at its core, held that citizens would trade off 
free speech and other liberties for economic prosperity.  Given this basic "deal" 
between Russian citizens and their rulers, a snowballing economic crisis, with its 
unthinkable effect on energy prices (at least in the short term), would hit Russia 
particularly hard and force Russia's leaders to respond not only economically, but 
in the social sphere as well.  As Igor Yurgens, who heads Russia's Institute for 
Contemporary Development's Management Board (President Medvedev chairs 
its Board of Directors) recently noted, the effects of the current economic crisis 
do cause ripples in other areas: 
 
“The social contract consisted of limiting of civil rights in exchange for economic 
well-being,” … “At the current moment, economic well-being is shrinking. 
Correspondingly, civil rights should expand. It’s just simple logic.” (5) 
 
The "simple logic" of an expansion of civil liberties does not necessarily imply an 
orderly process.  Recent demonstrations, including the Day of Dissent and the 
tariff protests in the Far East, raise a red flag for security-minded authorities that 
social unrest is a possibility in the wake of financial meltdown.  
 
It seems reasonable that the former president and current prime minister, who 
boasted restoration of order  among his highest accomplishments as president, 
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would seek to control the fallout from this crisis in every sphere possible.  For 
example, Putin met this week's announcement that the Fitch international 
financial rating agency had downgraded Russia's status from “BBB” to “BBB-” 
with a response that exudes Putin's top down—power vertical—modus operandi:  
rating agencies operating in Russia (and specifically gauging the soundness of 
its financial policies and status) would have to be certified by the Finance 
Ministry.  (6) Control over the ability of an "independent" agency to gather 
negative information likely would produce more palatable ratings.  Unfortunately 
for Putin, any attempts to obscure the highly prized transparency that ratings 
agencies seek in financial transactions tend to produce undesirable results. 
 
Russia's downgraded rating is but a symptom of the larger crisis, including a 
looming currency meltdown, that edges ever closer to enveloping Russia.  
Coordinating a set of policies to address the multiple contingencies that an 
economic crisis might spark in Russia—clearly, a wise move at this juncture—
would best be formulated in a small council of trusted advisers, whose loyalties to 
the (former) president and prime minister have been proven over time.  As it 
happens, Russia already has such a council.  
 
The Russian Security Council met quietly on February 13; its agenda was not 
published, but an official report states that its participants discussed issues of 
internal and external security, and it seems certain that the topic of conversation 
at least must have flitted over the probability of unrest in Russia's regions as the 
economic crisis broadens.  (7) The participants of the Security Council meeting 
included the current and former president (in their only formal and reported 
recent meeting), as well as the Secretary of the Council, former FSB Director 
Nikolai Patrushev, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Defense 
Anatolii Serdyukov, heads of the MVD and FSB, legislative leaders, and the 
heads of the government and Kremlin administrations. (8)  The composition 
represents a remarkably tight group of colleagues, who seem to have resisted 
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the temptation, so often apparent in the past, of divulging the content of 
discussions held in the Council. 
 
The Security Council, since its inception, has been a state organ of remarkable 
potential authority.  However, its stature tends to rise and fall with the relative 
status of its leader.  Many times it has been viewed as a pleasant pasture in 
which to place leading officials upon their removal from high office.  Nonetheless, 
in a crisis, the Security Council can call together both a leader's most trusted and 
most effective officials.  Russia's current circumstances may require just such a 
star chamber; it certainly bears watching. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) "Dmitri Medvedev submitted candidates for the office of regional governor to 
the four respective representative bodies," 16 Feb 09, the Kremlin website via 
www.kremlin.ru. 
(2) "A list of the first hundred members of the high-potential managerial pool, 
selected under the auspices of the Russian President, has been announced..," 
17 Feb 09, the Kremlin website via http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/sdocs/news.shtml. 
(3) Ibid.; For a list of the Top 100, please see "Pervaya sotnaya" reserva at 
www.kremlin.ru. 
(4) "Kremlin Fires 4 Governors, Gordeyev," By Nabi Abdullaev, Natalya Krainova, 
The Moscow Times, 17 Feb 09 via 
http://www.themoscowtimes.ru/article/1010/42/374576.htm.  
(5) "Political Aide Says Kremlin May Need to Ease Control," By Andrew Kramer, 
9 Feb 09, New York Times via 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/business/worldbusiness/10ruble.html. 
(6) "Fitch revised its Sovereign Rating…," Credit and Investment No 21, Banking 
and Stock Exchange, Finance, Economics Report, 6 Feb 09; What the Papers 
Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis Academic; "Finance Ministry likely to grant 
accreditation to rating agencies," RosBusinessConsulting Database, 9 Feb 634 
EST via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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(7) " Operativnoe soveshchanie postoiannykh chlenov Soveta Bezopastnosti 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii," 13 Feb 09, Russian Federation Security Council website 
via http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/404.html. 
(8) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Population, immigration, and the economy 
Russia’s declining population has long been an area of concern for the 
government.  Global statistics organizations have predicted that the country 
would lose 20-50 million people between 2025 and 2050. (1) This may amount to 
two-thirds of Russia’s current workforce. (2) Rosstat, Russia’s own bureau of 
statistics, recently announced that since 2002, the country’s population has 
decreased to 141.9 million, a decrease of approximately 3.3 million people.  This 
figure, which was released in preparation of a nationwide meeting of Russian 
statisticians to prepare the country’s 2010 census, represents an average annual 
population reduction of 0.4 percent, which rose from 0.1 percent losses between 
1989 and 2002.  In contrast, Russia’s population grew by 0.7 percent annually 
between 1979 and 1989. (3) In fact, if the growth of population from the 1979 to 
the 1989 census were projected to 2009, Russia’s population would amount to 
168,250,000 persons, some 26 million more than the actual number! 
 
The population decline since 1989 was due in part to a generally low standard of 
living that dramatically reduced the average life expectancy of Russian citizens, 
especially those living outside the country’s urban centers.  By 2002, the average 
age of the Russian populace was only 37.1 years. (4) When coupled with 
economic and political insecurity in Post-Soviet Russia that caused fertility rates 
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to plummet to 1.4 by 1993, (5) it is not difficult to account for the six million 
people that have disappeared from Russia’s population in the past two decades.  
 
So how is it possible that the population crisis seems to be approaching a turning 
point in the midst of the worst economic crisis to hit Russia in a decade?  At first 
glance, it seems that Russian families simply needed a push in the right 
direction.  When then-President Vladimir Putin declared that 2008 would be the 
“Year of the Family” in 2007, many were doubtful that he would be able to 
reverse the dire population trends that have reduced post-Soviet Russia’s 
population from 148.7 at its peak (6) to 141.9 million people as of December 
2008. (7) Putin’s carefully orchestrated plan was designed to raise both marriage 
and childbirth rates in Russia.  Most notably, the plan included the creation of an 
annual “Family Contact Day,” an official nationwide celebration of Russian 
“marital closeness” on September 12, exactly nine months before “Russia Day” 
on June 12. (8) [Covered in more detail in The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV 
Number 14 (24 July 2008).] 
 
Even though there are still months to go before “Russia Day” 2009, there are 
already signs that the Kremlin’s focus on population growth may be working. 
Despite the fact that a recent United Nations study predicted that Russia’s 
population would drop by 0.5 percent (approximately 667,000 persons) in 2008, 
there was only a decline of 212,000 persons from 2007, the smallest number in 
more than a decade. Some are even predicting that by 2015 the fertility rate 
could climb to 1.6, slowing the population decrease to below 200,000 per year. 
(9) On the opposite end of the spectrum, the average age of Russian citizens is 
rising.  It currently stands at 38.7 years, up 1.6 years from the 2002 rate.  This 
figure was derived from the male and female averages, which are currently 36 
and 41 years, respectively. Rosstat also reported that this trend is likely to 
continue and even increase in the future, in conjunction with rising living 
standards. (10) 
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The slowly growing birth rate and rising median age are encouraging signs for 
Russia’s long-term economic future, but over the past few years, the government 
has been forced to explore alternate short-term plans to increase the population 
and boost the workforce.  One major initiative, which began in January 2007, 
changed Russia’s immigration policy by creating quotas and established rules 
regarding illegal immigrants.  The new immigration policy is meant to tie 
immigration to Russia’s domestic economic needs. The initiative also created a 
six-year program that facilitates the “repatriation” of former Russian citizens, who 
would increase the population by an estimated 6-7 million persons.  In the first 
two weeks of the program, more than 20,000 persons applied to receive money, 
benefits, and government support for their bid to regain citizenship. (11) 
 
Today, Russia is second only to the United States in number of immigrants, with 
more than 200,000 legal migrants (12) from other post-Soviet republics, former 
satellite nations and as far away as Vietnam, China, and Afghanistan arriving 
annually and with an estimated three to four million living illegally inside its 
borders. (13) This figure is expected to rise to 300,000 by 2015.  Although these 
numbers are too small to offset the population decline, low-cost migrant workers 
have helped to mitigate unskilled labor shortages in construction, retail and other 
service sectors, and transportation and have allowed domestic businesses to 
keep wages high and prices low.  Both of these factors were considered 
blessings until last fall, when the one-two punch of the global credit crunch and 
falling oil prices sent the Russian economy into a downward spiral. 
 
Currently, unemployment in Russia has risen steadily since the December 2008 
figures of 5.8 million persons, or 7.7 percent, were released. (14) Experts predict 
that the Russian economy soon will be in recession and that by the end of 2009, 
more than 2.2 million citizens will be forced to rely on the state for income. (15) 
Although President Dmitri Medvedev went public on Russian TV to acknowledge 
the economic slump and reassure citizens that the government is working to 
create jobs and educate workers to fight unemployment, (16) many people are 
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still looking for someone to blame, which means that the tensions, which 
continuously simmer among Russia’s more xenophobic “extremist” groups may 
soon spread to the rest of the population. 
 
Aggressive, sometimes violent xenophobia is not a new issue in Russia.  Groups 
like Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DNPI) argue against migrant workers 
in economic terms, claiming that they are protesting illegal immigrants’ 
willingness to work for slave wages, terms under which Russian citizens cannot 
compete. However, they undermine any hope of a rational argument by 
punctuating their words with Nazi salutes and holding unregistered gatherings 
that often end in violence. (17) As the jobless rate in Russia worsens, however, 
the call for immigration reform is starting to come from more mainstream parties.   
 
One recent harbinger of things to come occurred when more than 100 members 
of Molodaya Gvardia (Young Guard), the youth wing of Putin’s United Russia 
party, gathered in Moscow to protest the arrival of a train from Tashkent in order 
to “protect the rights of Russian workers during times of crisis” by chanting anti-
illegal slogans and handing out Federal Migration Service cards. Like similar pro-
Kremlin groups Nashi (Ours) and Mestnye (Locals), Molodaya Gvardia’s actions 
generally straddle the line between pride and radical nationalism, but of late, they 
have stepped up their anti-immigration campaign.  In addition to the train station 
protests, group members have begun to pick up migrant day laborers under the 
guise of hiring them and instead drop them off at Migration Service offices. (18) 
 
Perhaps most troubling is the fact that even before the financial crisis hit Russia, 
a June 2008 poll showed that 55 percent of the population believed that “the best 
way to limit ethnic tensions was to ‘limit the flow of unskilled labor’ and make it 
more difficult to obtain entrance permits and registration.” (19) The government 
officially continues to oppose racism and support immigration as a means of 
increasing the population, but this could change if the Kremlin acquiesces to the 
growing groundswell of popular support for toughening immigration. If it does, 
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what happens when the financial crisis is over and there are once again too 
many jobs for the “Russian” Russians to fill?  The Kremlin might want to consider 
implementing a second “Family Contact Day” as soon as possible. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Sara Rhodin, “From Russia with love: A new holiday to fight population 
decline,” International Herald Tribune, 8 Jul 08 via 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/08/europe/russia.php. Last accessed 15 Feb 
09. 
(2) Ben Aris, “Russian babies up, jobs down,” Business New Europe, 12 FEB 09 
via http://businessneweurope.eu/story1448/Russian_babies_up_jobs_down.  
Last accessed 15 FEB 09. 
(3) “Russian population down by 3.3m, to 141.9m people,” ITAR-TASS, 11 Feb 
09 via Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 12 Feb 09, 2009-#30. 
(4) “Russian babies up, jobs down” Ibid.  
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) “Russian population down by 3.3m, to 141.9m people” Ibid.  
(8) “From Russia with love: A new holiday to fight population decline” Ibid.  
(9) “Russian babies up, jobs down” Ibid. 
(10) “Russian population down by 3.3m, to 141.9m people” Ibid. 
(11) Adisa Banjanovic, “Russia's new immigration policy will boost the 
population,” Euromonitor archive, 14 Jun 07 via 
http://www.euromonitor.com/Russias_new_immigration_policy_will_boost_the_p
opulation.  Last accessed 15 Feb 09. 
(12) “Russian babies up, jobs down” Ibid. 
(13) Nikola Krastev, “In The Heart Of New York, Russia's 'Soft Power' Arm 
Gaining Momentum,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 15 Feb 09 via 
http://www.rferl.org/content/In_The_Heart_Of_New_York_Russias_Soft_Power_
Arm_Gaining_Momentum/1493429.html.  Last accessed 15 Feb 09. 
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(14) Lynn Berry, “Medvedev assures Russians as jobless rate grows,” 
Associated Press via Business Week, 15 Feb 09 via 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D96C4MS80.htm.  Last 
accessed 15 Feb 09. 
(15) “Russian babies up, jobs down” Ibid. 
(16) “Medvedev assures Russians as jobless rate grows” Ibid. 
(17) Roland Oliphant, “Extremists and the mainstream,” Moscow News, 12 Feb 
09 via http://mnweekly.rian.ru/comment/20090212/55367086.html. Last accessed 
15 Feb 09. 
(18) Ibid. 
(19) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
GRU finally at risk? 
Late in November 2008, it was reported that a number of senior officers in 
Russia's armed forces had resigned in protest at the latest batch of proposed 
military reforms. The most significant name on this list was that of General 
Valentin Korabelnikov, commanding officer of the GRU, Russia's Military 
Intelligence Agency. Within 24 hours of the story's publication, the Defense 
Ministry had issued a statement labeling the reports as "brazen lies."  (1) Until 
recently, there were no further indications as to the true situation at GRU. 
 
Two weeks ago, a report surfaced that seemed to confirm that the GRU will not 
be immune to the proposed reforms – instead, it faces relegation to second-class 
status. Thus, according to the Moskovskiy komsomolets, senior figures at the 
Ministry of Defense are discussing the idea of stripping the GRU of its Special 
Forces and transferring these units to regular army command, instead. The 
(alleged) reasoning behind this move is that GRU troops performed well below 
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expectations during last fall's Georgian conflict, leading to the belief that it would 
be "more efficient" to "manage" them if they did not operate autonomously. (2) 
Also, the GRU could be stripped of its strategic intelligence role, leaving it to 
handle purely operational matters. But, the final and perhaps most important 
question concerns personalities. The Moskovskiy komsomolets claims that 
Korabelnikov, rather than resigning, is on the verge of retirement, and has failed 
to anoint a successor. It is rumored that a senior officer will be brought in from 
SVR (Russia's Foreign Intelligence Agency) to replace him. (3) 
 
None of this information has been confirmed, as yet. But the GRU's 
independence has been viewed with discomfort—if not disdain—for some time, 
particularly by those with ties to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the FSB. The 
siloviki have launched a number of takeover attempts in the past, all of which 
have failed, at least in part due to Korabelnikov’s personal authority. If the GRU's 
commander is indeed departing the scene, the agency's enemies will have one 
more opportunity to impose their will and to bring Russia's last remaining 
independent security service to heel, as they have done with the Border Guards 
Service and the Interior Ministry, amongst others. 
 
Politkovskaya jury to deliberate 
In November 2008, the trial of three individuals charged with complicity in the 
murder of Anna Politkovskaya began in Moscow.  By the end of January, it was 
clear that there were serious flaws in the prosecution's case, specifically relating 
to the defendants' alibis, DNA, and fingerprints.  (4) These discrepancies have 
left the State in a quandary: if the Makhmudov brothers are acquitted, the only 
person remaining in custody in connection with the case will be FSB Lieutenant 
Colonel Pavel Ryaguzov.      
 
Earlier this month, lawyers acting on behalf of the defendants and Ms. 
Politkovskaya's family presented several pieces of evidence and testimony that, if 
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verified, would place responsibility for her murder squarely on the Security 
Services. 
 
First, on February 5th, Anna Stavitskaya (one of the Politkovskaya family's 
attorneys), read into the record an official FSB document dated 19 days before 
the assassination. Apparently an internal memorandum, the document was a 
request from one FSB directorate to another for full details on the reporter's 
whereabouts, address, and "personal details." This request allegedly was entirely 
separate from Ryaguzov's reconnaissance work, supposedly carried out as a 
rogue mission, purely for monetary gain, on behalf of the putative triggerman. (5) 
 
The same day, Sergei Khadzhikurbanov, former police officer and alleged 
conspirator took the stand in his own defense. Khadzhikurbanov claimed that 
"investigators" had tried to persuade him to implicate exiled billionaire Boris 
Berezovsky in the assassination and to claim that the orders for the hit came 
from Chechnya. In return for his cooperation, Khadzhikurbanov could expect to 
be "withdrawn" (read, granted immunity) from the case. (6) Given that he was 
charged with conspiracy, it is evident that Khadzhikurbanov refused this “offer.” 
 
On February 6th, Judge Yevgeni Zubov, presiding, announced that the 
evidentiary part of the trial was complete, and scheduled closing arguments and 
jury instructions for February 16th.  Thereafter, the jury will consider a verdict. (7) 
 
If the press reports on the trial are accurate, the jury will have no choice but to 
acquit the defendants, leaving the case unsolved and the Security Services—
exposed as accessories to murder, at a minimum—embarrassed. The decision to 
have an open trial surely is being regretted in Moscow. Had the trial been closed, 
the cover-up could have been carried through without any problems. 
 
Addendum: Defendants acquitted 
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On Tuesday 17 February, defense and prosecution attorneys presented their 
closing arguments. Prosecution lawyers argued that the evidence was 
conclusive, claiming that “that the people sitting on the dock” are “guilty in 
relation to the execution of the murder of Anna Politkovskaya.” (8) Defense 
attorneys in their turn described the State’s evidence as consisting of “dust, fluff, 
and ash,” adding that the prosecution’s file was “fundamentally flawed.” (9) 
 
 Within hours of being handed the case, the jury in the trial returned to the 
courtroom with a unanimous “not guilty” verdict, resulting in the immediate 
release of the three individuals charged. Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Ryaguzov, an 
additional defendant, also was acquitted and released.  Authorities have 
responded to the verdict with the assertion that they will file an appeal. (10) It 
seems clear at the time of writing that such a move would have only one chance 
of “success” – a closed trial, or a simple overruling of the verdict by a more pliant 
judge. What effect such an action would have on Russia’s image is clear. The 
question is whether those in authority care. 
 
Litvinenko trial? 
Ever since Aleksandr Litvinenko's murder in November of 2006, British and 
Russian authorities have waged a war of words over the handling of the 
investigation.  Accusations and allegations have flown in both directions, while 
the prime suspect, Andrei Lugovoi, has received parliamentary immunity in 
Russia (obtaining a seat in the Duma 14 months ago). 
 
It seems now that Russia is attempting to ratchet down its rhetoric, in order to 
remove the row from the diplomatic scene. On 7 February, Yuriy Fedotov, 
Russia's ambassador to the Court of St. James, was interviewed by Interfax. 
Fedotov stated that "passions over this problem" had risen "too high," and that 
Russia and Britain needed to return to a more "constructive" relationship. (11) 
Fedotov claimed that a Russian proposal had been—or was about to be—made 
to have "judicial hearings" on the case in a Russian court, using "documents 
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provided by the British side." (12) It seems that Russian authorities no longer 
have any objection to their citizens giving evidence at such a hearing, presuming 
"security guarantees" from Britain are forthcoming. It has been stressed however, 
that the choice of whether to appear before a hearing or not would be a purely 
"private affair" for the alleged suspects. (13) 
 
Despite appearances, little has changed. Russia's "proposal" is highly unlikely to 
be approved in Whitehall: there are simply too many unanswered questions 
surrounding Lugovoi's fate. How could any trial be legitimate if the lead suspect 
was not forced to appear – as in any trial in a Western judicial system? Given 
Russia's constitutional ban on extradition, where would Lugovoi serve his 
sentence if convicted? How could British authorities explain, for domestic-political 
purposes, their decision to pass jurisdiction to a foreign power? 
 
Moscow could have made a proposal similar to the one agreed to with Libya over 
the Lockerbie bombers, namely have a Sovereign British court meeting on 
neutral soil, with any sentence to be served on said neutral territory. It is evident 
that the current proposal is not at all a serious one. Instead, it is simply another 
attempt by Moscow to portray itself as cooperative and as respectful of 
international judicial norms. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Defense Ministry Denies Reports on Resignation Of Top Military Officials 
(Part 2)," Interfax, 29 Nov 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(2) "Russian Paper Reports on Proposal To Transfer GRU Forces To Ground 
Troops," Moskovskiy komsomolets, 23 Jan 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(3) Ibid.  
(4) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 7 (5 February 09)  
(5) "FSB Requested Politkovskaya Data Shortly Before Murder," Interfax AVN 
Online, 5 Feb 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
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(6) "Russian Murder Suspect Says He Was Pressured To Implicate Fugitive 
Tycoon," Interfax, 5 Feb 09; OSC Translated Excerpt via World News 
Connection.  
(7) "Moscow Military Court Completes Politkovskaya Murder Investigation," 
ITAR-TASS, 6 Feb 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(8) “Prosecutor Demands Guilty Verdict In Politkovskaya Murder Trial,” Deutsche 
Welle, 17 Feb 09 via www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4035699,00.html?maca=en-
rss-en-top-1022-rdf.  
(9) “Defense In Politkovskaya Trial Alleges Fabrication, The Washington Post, 17 
Feb 09 via www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR2009021701274.html.  
(10) “Politkovskaya Suspects Acquitted,” BBC News, 19 Feb 09 via 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7899472.stm.  
(11) "Russian Envoy Hopes UK Will Agree To Hear Litvinenko Case In Russia," 
Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 7 Feb 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis.  
(12) "Russian Envoy Hopes UK Will Agree To Hear Litvinenko Case in Russia," 
Interfax, 7 Feb 09; OSC Translated Excerpt via World News Connection.  
(13) "Moscow Expects London To Agree To Hear Litvinenko Case At Russian 
Court-Ambassador," Interfax, 9 Feb 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Erik Rundquist 
 
Russian military reform – can industry keep pace?      
Heated discussions persist on Russian military reforms, which are primarily 
concerned with doctrine, task organization, manpower reduction, and the 
consolidation (closing) of some facilities.  Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov’s 
focus remains centered on the creation of lighter, leaner, and highly mobile 
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combat brigades. (1)  In order to shape these reforms, technology will be a 
critical enabler for the military where command and control, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), rapid mobility, and the ability to carry out 
precision strikes are important components.  In terms of the broader reform 
effort, some key projects of the Russian military-industrial complex may provide 
an indication as to whether or not Serdyukov’s reform can maintain the pace he 
has set.  Over the last few months, there has been discussion on the Russian 
Navy’s “Bulava” missile, the Russian Air Force’s 5th generation fighter, and the 
overall state of Russia’s defense industry (especially ISR assets).  Without 
industry and the technology needed for combat troops in the field, the road to 
reform may prove problematic for Serdyukov as Russia begins its massive troop 
cuts.    
 
Russian navy missile tests  
With regards to naval strike capability, the Russian military has continued to 
struggle with its advanced “Bulava” missile.  Its most recent launch on December 
23, 2008 resulted in self-destruction during its flight.  This test marked the fifth 
failure out of a total of ten launches and sparked a comment from Deputy Prime 
Minister Sergei Ivanov to the Russian Space Agency, “Not enough attention is 
given to on-the-ground work on the components of the Bulava strategic missile 
system items.” (2)  The Russian Navy hopes the missile can deliver warheads at 
a range of up to 8,000 kilometers flying at a “very low” flight trajectory and 
maneuvering with hypersonic engines to confound enemy defenses. (3)  
However, the Bulava has been in the testing phase since December 2003 and in 
order to meet the requirements for the navy, Ivanov noted that missile series 
production will begin in 2009, despite the obvious need for additional tests. (4)  
This seems to imply that the production line might be open for a weapon system 
that is not fully vetted. 
 
In order to close the gap between operations and development, more tests (at 
least five) with a focus on correcting the malfunctioning third stage are likely in 
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2009.  With these new tests in mind, 2010 is the new operational deployment 
date for the Bulava missile. (5)  Under the guise of expediency and cost 
effectiveness, some pundits have called for the missile system to be scrapped 
altogether.  A source in the Russian defense industry noted, “We are doomed to 
having to make Bulava work; there is no alternative to it …. Replacing Bulava 
with a new missile does not seem possible. First, huge resources have already 
been spent on it.” (6)  The source further adds that critical submarine design and 
technical components, as well as launch technique would force the Russian Navy 
and industrial designers to “Start everything from scratch.” (7)  Clearly, this would 
disrupt the ability to conduct quick technological reform for the navy.  
 
Adding pressure on the beleaguered weapons developers, Chief of the General 
Staff Nikolai Makarov commented on the recent missile failure, “Either the 
military-industrial complex, or the production itself, or designers may be to blame 
for the accident.  Personally I am inclined to think it was the second theory.” (8)  
As finger-pointing continues, pundits and military veterans have noted that 
precious energy and resources are being spent on a system they claim will never 
work.  Colonel Oleg Sergeyev, a candidate of technical sciences and veteran of 
the Strategic Missile Troops, posits that the Moscow Institute of Thermal 
Technology (lead developer of the Bulava missile) is not testing the system 
properly and is “drying up the military budget.” (9)  He notes the ground-based 
“static” launches versus the complexities of sea-based launches and disputes, 
“The trial and error method, which is presented as ‘static tests,’ is ineffective, 
even if you add another five or more missile launches to the 10 unsuccessful 
ones.” (10)  
 
Russian 5th generation fighter aircraft 
Another visible element of Serdyukov’s reform centers on efforts to upgrade the 
Russian Air Force fighter fleet.  Air Force Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General 
Aleksander Zelin proposes a flight demonstration of the fighter on August 12, 
2009 (Russia’s next Air Force Day) since, “Work on the airplane is going 
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according to plan, and all goals are being met.” (11)  Supporting Zelin’s 
enthusiasm, Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov noted that this fighter would be 
day/night, all-weather, stealthy/low-signature, and operate long-range at 
supersonic speed.  He also commented on the advanced navigation and 
automated defense systems, which would be a feature of this aircraft, with tests 
to begin in 2009 and operational service being set for 2015. (12)  Unlike the 
Bulava missile system, there has been closer international cooperation, namely 
with India, for research and development of this aircraft.  Mikhail Pogosyan, 
general director of the Sukhoi company which is involved with the design, 
manufacturing, and assembly of the aircraft in Komsomolsk-na-Amure, remarked 
that the global financial crisis should not impact the timelines or future of this 
project. (13) 
 
While there is a sense of optimism surrounding the new fighter, some military 
analysts note that Zelin’s fifth generation aircraft are really fourth generation 
fighters with upgraded avionics.  One of the important elements that denotes a 
fifth generation fighter, namely stealth, is not seen with the SU-34, which has 22 
square meters of reflecting radar surface versus the United States Air Force’s F-
22 “Raptor” with a reflecting surface of 0.003 square meters. (14)  
 
Another Russian Defense Ministry expert source points out that many of the 
modifications to the Russian fighters (Mikoyan-Guervich MiG-35 or the Sukhoi 
Su-35) are primarily designed to assist in extending the lifespan of these aircraft 
and that Russia’s fifth generation fighter program has “largely remained on 
paper.” (15)  In the meantime, an aging Russian aerospace industry workforce, 
slumping oil prices, and continued cooperation with the government of India (for 
funding) all play into the development of Russia’s next front-line fighter, as well 
as meeting Serdyukov’s reform objectives. (16) 
 
The industrial climate 
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Regarding Russia’s military-industrial complex, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
observed that this vital industry links 1,400 companies and over 1.5 million 
employees throughout the country.  Concerning the global economic crisis, Putin 
added, “Many [defense plants] encountered both delayed payment for shipped 
products and creditor indebtedness, and difficulties arose with access to loan 
proceeds.” (17)  He further announced that an investigation would be started to 
examine whether or not banks artificially raised their interest loan rates to 
defense industries that are working to meet Russian military reform efforts.  In 
addition, Putin is examining the “mistakes of management” of defense industry 
leaders, whose equipment export is essential to the Russian economy. (18) 
 
Another impact of the financial crisis on the defense industry centers on raw 
materials.  For example, the price of nickel alloys, despite an overall reduction in 
demand (outside of the defense industry), has increased.  Pointing out Russian 
inefficiencies, Salyut General Director Yuri Yeliseyev commented at an “anti-
crisis conference” that in some cases it is currently cheaper to import materials 
from France than to obtain them from suppliers in the Moscow region.  This 
prompted Russian President Dmitri Medvedev to call for a reduction in prices of 
some raw materials. (19) 
 
While money and material challenges are affecting the military industrial 
complex, Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov recently commented on the exodus of 
qualified technical workers from the defense industry.  More disconcerting to 
Ivanov is that the loss of nearly 50,000 defense industry engineers and workers 
in 2008 took place while there was a drastic increase in government military work 
orders. (20) 
 
Perhaps linked to this exodus of defense workers is the fact that the Russian 
military is potentially looking outside of Russia to fill its desperate requirements 
for upgraded unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platforms for its battlefield ISR.  
These systems are critical in assisting senior leaders and tactical commanders in 
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supporting ground and air operations in near real-time.  In December 2008, 
General Makarov commented, “If our industry is unable to produce the kind of 
[UAV] drones that we need in the near future, we may buy one trial batch in 
Israel.” (21)  This comment prompted a wave of concern within the defense 
industry, where companies have attempted to block any outside purchase under 
the guise that it would damage the Russian UAV export potential in the future. 
Additionally, recent trade fairs indicate a possibility that Russian UAV makers 
may work with international joint partners, much like the fifth generation fighter 
program. (22)  Not surprisingly, the director of the Russian UAV program at Vega 
Concern, Arkady Syroyezhko, believes that the domestic industry can meet the 
needs of the military.  Syroyezhko claims that foreign systems may result in 
higher costs when maintenance, spare parts, and shipping are factored in. (23)  
While not stated, it seems logical that an imported UAV might bear greater 
training costs with foreign instructors, and the turn-around time for repairing 
damaged UAVs, which may have to be shipped back to their main assembly 
plants, could hamper replacement efforts. 
 
While the overall reform of the Russian military is ambitious, it is essential that 
military production keep pace.  If not, significant gaps in technical capabilities 
may be the result.  Some of this technology is meant to act as a “force multiplier” 
for a smaller and more agile army, so it is obvious that the Russian defense 
industry must meet its timelines as the Russian military force begins to shrink. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 4 (6 Nov 08) for discussion on 
eliminating intermediate command levels and redistricting for mobile brigades.  
(2) “Russian official slams space agency over Bulava missile,” RIA Novosti, 26 
Jan 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) “Russian paper views political implications of failed Bulava missile test,” 
Moskovskiy komsomolets, 24 Dec 08; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – 
Political, 25 Dec 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(11) “Russia: Report considers prospects for fifth-generation aircraft,” Vremya 
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(23) “Russian industry can produce modern UAVs for armed forces – expert,” 
Interfax News Agency, 28 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Shaun Barnes 
 
Russia continues its Latin American offensive 
Despite criticism by some analysts, Russia is continuing efforts to deepen its ties 
with Latin America.  Recent state visits by the Presidents of Bolivia and Cuba 
saw further economic agreements and more rhetoric on the virtues of 
transoceanic partnership.  In spite of the positive spin Moscow places on its Latin 
American ventures, the absence of apparent benefits for Russia and the impact 
of the economic crisis have called their efficacy into question. 
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On February 16th Bolivian President Evo Morales was in Russia for an official 
visit, the first ever by a Bolivian head of state.  The primary purpose of the trip 
was the strengthening of energy cooperation between the two countries.   
Morales (a member of the radical anti-US wing in Latin America) and Russian 
President Dmitri Medvedev built upon plans laid in 2008,  agreeing to intensive 
joint development of the natural gas industry in Bolivia that will encompass both 
“fossil fuels exploration and [construction of] a gas transport system.”  Medvedev 
suggested these projects would be very long-term in nature, possibly stretching 
out to 2030 before reaching completion. (1)  Gazprom already has been working 
with Bolivia’s recently nationalized gas industry to plan the necessary 
investments.  The centerpiece of this cooperative project is the construction of a 
$1.5 billion pipeline intended to carry natural gas from Bolivia to its major export 
market in Argentina and which is expected to create a four-fold increase in the 
transport capacity of the former. (2) 
 
In addition, the joint declaration signed by Medvedev and Morales touched on 
several other issues.  Russia pledged its “technical and logistical” cooperation in 
curbing narcotics trafficking in Bolivia, an area where the United States once 
played a major role. (3)  Morales’ support for coca-growing, indigenous farmers 
prompted him to halt Bolivia’s drug enforcement cooperation with Washington, 
which advocated coca eradication by aerial spraying. (4)  This created a vacuum 
that Moscow now seems eager to fill.  
 
In a clear favor for Russia, Morales also joined Medvedev in condemning U.S. 
plans to build a missile defense system in Central Europe.  The joint declaration 
states, “The presidents have expressed concern over the realization of the U.S. 
missile defence programme in Europe, as well as over further NATO expansion 
to the East, having described these actions as contradicting the goals of 
achieving peace and security that all the governments should be guided by.” (5) 
As a practical matter, there is, of course, little that Bolivia could do to influence 
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NATO expansion or ABM disputes, but the statement is representative of the 
increasingly friendly nature of relations between Moscow and La Paz. 
 
Morales’ visit to Russia was the second this year by a Latin American head of 
state.  The first was made at the end of January by Raul Castro, now the de-facto 
ruler of Cuba due to his brother Fidel’s failing health.  Castro was just as warmly 
received as Morales and managed to walk away with a new $20 million loan from 
Moscow, continuing the trend of renewed Russian aid to the communist island 
nation. (6)  In his comments before meeting with Castro, Medvedev indicated that 
economic ties between the two countries would continue to grow, when he noted 
that the $239 million bilateral trade between them was “absolutely not the kind of 
level that can satisfy our countries.” (7) 
 
Questions have been raised about the wisdom of expanding Russia’s ties to 
Latin America, generally.  Just as Dmitri Medvedev began his four nation tour of 
the region in November, Yevgeni Trifonov was decrying this “Last Dash to the 
Pampas” for the meager benefits it promised to deliver to Russia.  In particular, 
Trifonov noted the lack of economic complementarity between Russia and Latin 
America, both of which are major commodity exporters that satisfy much of their 
high technology needs by imports from the U.S., Europe, and Asia. (8) 
 
There is also skepticism of the foreign investment plans by Russia’s energy 
firms, given the low energy prices and falling global demand brought about by the 
economic crisis.  One observer recognized that in this environment, “neither 
Russian business nor the state have funds to struggle with domestic difficulties” 
let alone major investment projects abroad. (9)  Indeed, Gazprom’s chief financial 
officer recently announced a “cost-cutting drive” that involved “prioritising projects 
in our investment programme ... and this will allow us to see which projects will 
be financed and which projects are going ahead.” (10) 
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So far, no delays in Latin American have been announced.  Even if they are, 
many Russian joint ventures and investment projects are long-term in nature, 
with plans stretching out over decades, so delays in the short term may not 
become indefinite.  Prices in the energy markets are notoriously capricious and 
could be driven back up by an economic recovery at the end of this year or in 
early 2010, reinvigorating Russia’s state energy companies.  
 
Still, the kind of large, capital intensive investments that the Russian energy 
sector is planning will not be remunerative soon, even under the best conditions.  
Politically, Russia’s gains in Latin America appear limited to verbal 
condemnations of NATO policy and Nicaragua’s lone recognition of Georgia’s 
break-away provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Under the circumstances, 
one cannot help but question the strategic imperative driving Russia’s recent 
diplomatic emphasis on Latin America and the veracity of its grand designs for 
multi-billion dollar investment projects. 
 
Source Notes: 
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09 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090216/120163110.html. 
(3) “Press Statements following Russian-Bolivian Talks” 
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Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Gazprom presses on 
Last spring, Oleg Urnev, the general director of Severstal’s Izhora Pipe Plant, 
announced that his factory had won an exclusive contract to supply Gazprom 
with high-quality pipes for the gas monopoly’s Bonanenkovo-Ukhta megaproject 
located on the Yamal peninsula. “We are pleased to announce that … Izhora 
Pipe Plant has become the first pipe maker to be able to use a technology for 
manufacturing this complex product mix, enabling us to guarantee supplies to 
Gazprom.” (1) A year later, Urnev’s enthusiasm for the partnership has waned as 
the gas monopoly fell behind on payments for orders it placed in 2008. 
 
Gazprom’s arrears to the pipe manufacturer rose to over $1.2 million in the first 
months of 2009, from $717 thousand at the end of 2008. (2) Gazprom officials 
have declined to comment on the debt, which, when measured against 
Gazprom’s overall debt burden of over $60 billion, may be fairly regarded as a 
pittance.  (3) Yet the fact that the monopoly has allowed payments to slip on 
Yamal, a project it describes as one “of utter importance for the purpose of 
ensuring gas production growth in Russia,” and to which it recently accorded 
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highest priority, is a sign of accounting trouble that may put Gazprom’s plans to 
expand into European markets in jeopardy. (4) 
 
Last year, the monopoly launched construction of the Bonanenkovo-Ukhta 
trunkline to carry gas from the Yamal peninsula to western Russia, from which 
point the company plans to channel gas supplies directly into Germany via Nord 
Stream, a pipeline project still in the planning stage. (5) Now the Izhora Pipe 
Plant has put deliveries for the Bonanenkovo-Ukhta project on hold until 
Gazprom is able to make new payment arrangements. “We’re currently filling 
orders for other customers,” Urnev says. (6) 
 
Despite budget troubles at home, Gazprom officials assured a group of investors 
meeting in London earlier this month that the company would push ahead with 
Yamal gas field production and Nord Stream pipeline construction. (7) In fact, the 
monopoly appears to be giving these projects renewed priority status as it 
sharpens its focus on supplying energy to consumers and boosting tax revenues 
for the Russian government. To that end, the numbers telegraphed from Europe 
are not good. Gazprom is anticipating a five percent drop in European demand 
for Russian energy supplies in 2009, a figure that translates to 170 billion cubic 
meters of gas, down from 179 billion cubic meters in 2008. (8) At the same time, 
the falling price of oil has dragged the average price per 1,000 cubic meters of 
gas down to $280 from last year’s average of $409 on European markets. (9) 
 
For Gazprom, already struggling to shore up sagging production just to meet its 
current debt obligations, such numbers are inauspicious. Dark market forecasts 
have compelled the monopoly and its European partners to delay commission of 
the South Stream pipeline, Nord Stream’s southern twin, expected to link 
Russian gas fields directly to customers in southern Europe. The pipeline was 
originally scheduled to open in 2013, at a cost of $20 billion. (10) This month 
Gazprom announced that the pipeline would not open until sometime in 2015, at 
a revised cost of $31 billion. (11) 
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Regardless of dire economic indicators, however, Gazprom is resolved to realize 
the most expensive projects in the company’s history. The reasons for this have 
little to do with today’s global economic downturn, and much to do with future 
geopolitical considerations. 
 
First, Moscow is determined to cut Ukraine out of its European energy transit 
scheme. The escalation of last month’s gas dispute into a complete shut-off of 
Russian energy supplies to Europe remains a public-relations disaster for which 
Moscow will not accept any measure of blame. On the contrary, Moscow has 
sought to turn the crisis to its advantage by portraying Ukraine as an unreliable 
transit state to which it is loath to entrust its gas flows bound for Europe. (12) 
Moscow’s attempt to discredit the Ukrainian government may arise in part from 
commercial considerations; Gazprom is presently required to negotiate 
potentially onerous transit deals with its neighbor, but the political dimension 
yields a more cogent analysis of Moscow’s attempt to strip Ukraine of what 
influence it has as an energy-transit state and to further isolate Ukraine from 
Europe. With Ukraine discredited, Gazprom has a compelling reason to offer 
alternative energy routes to Europe via Nord Stream and South Stream. 
 
Second, Gazprom is keen to deepen its foothold in European energy markets. 
The global economic crisis may slow, but need not stall, its progress toward that 
aim. Nord Steam and South Stream will establish direct bilateral energy 
relationships between the Russian monopoly and its individual consumer 
countries, a development that effectively will magnify Moscow’s geopolitical clout 
in Europe and allow it to dispel EU efforts to form a unified energy policy for the 
continent. 
 
Third, as Oleg Urnev of the Izhora Pipe Plant can attest, Gazprom is simply too 
big to coerce into paying its petty debts when it is not inclined to oblige its 
Russian creditors. Asked by the pipe manufacturer to negotiate a payment 
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schedule, Gazprom replied that it was prepared to buy Izhora’s pipes at a thirty 
percent discount from 2008 prices. (13) If Izhora cannot deliver pipes on 
Gazprom’s terms, the monopoly simply will order its pipes from another 
manufacturer; Gazprom has alternatives and Izhora does not. 
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Russian Federation: Special Feature: Russia and Iran 
By Blake Brunner 
 
Cooperation and competition 
Less than two months into the new year, Iran already has commemorated two 
major milestones.  From late January to early February, ten days of nationwide 
national celebration marked the 30th anniversary of the country’s Islamic 
revolution.  In the midst of these festivities, on Feb. 2 Iran launched into space its 
first domestically produced satellite, Omid (the Farsi word for hope), on the back 
of its Safir-2 (ambassador or messenger-2) rocket. 
These achievements will not alter Iran’s status as the world’s most notorious 
pariah state, but the underlying implications—the entrenchment and stability of 
Islamic rule and the capacity for technological innovation, despite sanctions—
point to a changing regional and international role for the country.  The Iranian 
presidential elections in June 2009 may accelerate the pace of change. 
 
Iranian-Russian relations have been important for both parties, particularly during 
the second half of the Islamic republic’s existence: Russian exports, especially 
nuclear technology and weapons, have put Iran near the technological forefront 
of the Middle East, despite sanctions; and Iranian reactions to Russian policy 
toward Muslim states and non-state entities have demonstrated that Iran’s 
foreign policy can be more nuanced than knee-jerk radical rhetoric.  Given recent 
and forthcoming events in Iran, though, an examination and reevaluation of the 
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two countries’ mutual policies is in order, as future developments in Iran may 
provide it with new opportunities for expanded international relations. 
 
Certainly the most high-profile example of Russian-Iranian cooperation is Iran’s 
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.  Although Iran began the plant’s construction in 
1975 with the aid of the Germany-based Siemens AG, work ceased following the 
Islamic revolution in 1979, only to recommence with the aid of Russia’s 
Atomstroyexport in 1995.  The two countries had signed an agreement on 
nuclear cooperation in 1992, with the Bushehr plant originally scheduled to be 
completed by 1999.  Throughout the early weeks of 2009, Russian and Iranian 
news agencies have been publishing a flurry of articles citing officials from both 
countries, including Rosatom chief Sergei Kiriyenko, (1) voicing their commitment 
to completing the facility this year.  In hopes of meeting its most recent deadline, 
Atomstroyexport has expanded its number of experts in Iran from 1,000 to 1,800. 
(2) 
 
There is reason to question whether Atomstroyexport’s increased effort will allow 
construction to meet its latest deadline.  Bushehr’s 30-plus-year history is rife 
with unfulfilled promises from Iran and her nuclear collaborators, of which Russia 
is one of many, albeit the most important.  Iranian Ambassador to Russia 
Mahmoud-Reza Sajjadi himself recently griped about unnamed “other countries” 
which had not met their commitments to provide construction material for the 
plant in time. (3)  Considering the Bushehr facility’s multitude of literal and 
figurative working parts that remain out of commission, the plant at this point 
primarily plays a symbolic role, emphasizing Iran’s capacity to advance 
technologically, despite sanctions, as well as its possible future as an oil-rich 
country working to shed its own dependence on carbon-based energy. 
 
Of course, Bushehr also symbolizes fears of a nuclear-armed Iran, the 
“apocalyptic dangers” of which raise international alarms and have prompted the 
US to propose building a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. (4)  Yet, 
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Bushehr may never evolve into anything other than what it purports to be (i.e., a 
warhead).  Russia’s former foreign minister and national security adviser, Igor 
Ivanov, in April 2008 told the Jerusalem Post, “I don't think [Iran’s] political 
leadership is so stupid” as to attack Israel, and continued, "If all our experts left 
Iran tomorrow Bushehr would simply close down. ... Sometimes public opinion 
does not understand, thinking that we are helping Iran in some way to create 
military nuclear programs. This is not true." (5) Ivanov’s assurances have done 
little to assuage international concerns. 
 
Doubts about the civilian capacity of Bushehr stem in part from Iran’s appetite for 
hundreds of millions of dollars of Russian military exports. (6)  In 2005 Russia 
inked a $700 million deal to deliver to Iran 30 Tor-M1 short-range missile defense 
systems, (7) and in December of last year Iranian defense officials boasted that 
they had begun receiving deliveries of Russian S-300 medium-range missile 
defense systems, although Russia denied the claim. (8)  The S-300 system’s 
longer range allows it to be classified as more than simply a defensive system; 
and although news reports vary as to the specific type of S-300 that Russia may 
or may not be selling to Iran, the most advanced S-300 system apparently would 
thwart any Israeli air attack on Iran until at least 2011, at which point the Israeli 
air force will have received delivery of the Lockheed Martin F-35, which can 
circumvent the S-300’s advanced radar. (9)  In December 2008, an Israeli 
diplomat, Yigal Palmor told the Associated Press that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert had received assurances from Russia that the latter would not do 
anything to jeopardize Israel’s security. (10)  As of mid-February 2009, news 
reports are inconclusive as to whether the S-300 sales have happened or even 
will happen. 
 
The only other major military exporter doing comparable business in Iran is 
China, which has supplied Iran with a variety of missile technologies.  However, 
in recent years Russian arms exports to Iran have trumped Chinese exports by a 
vast margin: From 2002 to 2005, Russian arms exports to Iran totaled $1.7 
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billion, while Chinese arms exports to Iran totaled only $300 million. (11)  Thus, 
although China supplies the greatest percentage of Iran’s total imports, estimated 
at 15% of $67.79 billion annually (compared to Russia’s 5.7% of the total), the 
Iranian arms market is of greater importance to Russia, and it is in Russia’s 
financial interest to continue to satisfy Iran. (12)  This may explain why Russia 
has continued to drag its feet on the S-300 issue; Russia may not want to 
disappoint an important client, but may be taking extra time to evaluate the 
potential diplomatic fallout from the deal.  More conclusive answers may emerge 
after Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar’s Feb. 16 visit to 
Moscow. (13) 
 
The two countries also enjoy trade of a more innocuous nature.  In late January 
of this year, a state-run television station in the Iranian province of East 
Azerbaijan reported on the provincial governor’s visit to Tatarstan, where a 
variety of automotive and agricultural trade agreements were signed. (14) 
Additionally, Iran has expressed at the national level an interest in increased 
Russian agricultural imports. (15)  
 
Of course, given that Russia and Iran hold the world’s largest and second-largest 
natural gas reserves, respectively, and considering Russia’s recent gas row with 
Ukraine in light of general global energy anxiety, it should come as no surprise 
that Russia and Iran plan to cooperate in the energy trade.  The countries have 
mooted plans to form a gas cooperative in the model of OPEC, with Qatar 
mentioned as a possible additional ally. (16)  Iran also has proposed that Russia 
act as the prime mover in setting up a Central-South Asian power grid. (17)  
Finally, Russia and Iran are seeking to formalize a gas-swapping deal by which 
either country may export gas for the other in exchange for a delivery of the 
same amount of gas. (18)  Similar proxy-selling of petroleum has in the past 
benefited Iran, allowing it to find possible buyers even among its own 
adversaries. (19)  In any case, Iran’s Fars News Agency is keen to point out that 
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foreign investment in the Iranian oil and gas sectors has not been hampered 
substantively by sanctions against the Islamic republic. (20) 
 
The monetary benefits of Russia’s catering to an under-served, emerging market 
are obvious, but Russia’s cooperation with the Islamic pariah state has garnered 
diplomatic benefits as well, namely Iranian temperance when it comes to conflicts 
involving Russia’s Muslim entities.  Iran’s overbearing pride in its own religious 
revolution colors the prism through which it views its more secular Muslim 
neighbors, and the country’s various efforts to invoke Islamic insurgency 
throughout the Muslim world have formed a primary pillar of its foreign policy, as 
has been evident in Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Pakistan.  Therefore, Iran’s 
assertion that the Chechen Wars were Russia’s “internal matter” (21) is 
surprising.  Furthermore, during Tajikistan’s civil war, Iran favored the use of 
diplomacy, rather than its typical fiery Islamic rhetoric, which one analyst 
attributes to Russian influence. (22) 
 
Indeed, it seems that there is little evidence that Russia’s and Iran’s mutually 
beneficial relationship will cease to exist in the near term.  However, the 
character of the relationship may change, due to three primary factors, the most 
prominent of which is the presidential election scheduled for June 12, 2009.  
Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, who served as president from 
1997 to 2005, announced on Feb. 9 his candidacy for re-election, pitting him 
against current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and possibly other candidates.  
Khatami is perceived outside Iran as less extreme than Ahmadinejad, who has 
risen to international fame as a Holocaust denier, but who is known inside Iran 
for policies that engendered a 30% inflation rate as recently as September 2008.  
Khatami, on the other hand, favors a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine 
conflict and has attacked both Ahmadinejad’s inflationary policies and his anti-
Semitism; this, in addition to Khatami’s honorary degrees from European 
universities, makes him a much more attractive leader from a Western 
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perspective.  If Khatami were re-elected, Russia would no doubt find itself 
competing for Iran’s attention, particularly if sanctions against Iran were lifted. 
 
In a different twist, Russia may find itself competing against Iran in the former 
Soviet republics of Central Asia, where Iran has invested in energy-generation 
infrastructure.  As noted previously in The ISCIP Analyst, (Vol. XIV No. 10), Iran 
is financing two hydropower stations in Tajikistan, and Tajik government 
dissatisfaction with Russia may lead to further opportunities for Iranian 
investment. (23)  In turn, Tajikistan has pledged to support Iran’s effort to 
become a permanent member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to 
which Iran currently enjoys only observer status. (24)  Russia and China do not 
favor Iran’s entry to the group. (25) 
 
Finally, there is the issue of basic demographics.  Iran’s population is significantly 
younger than Russia’s, with the former’s median age at 26.4 years, compared to 
the latter’s median age of 38.3 years.  A recent Swiss envoy to Iran predicts that 
Iran’s Islamic regime will outlast the “political time frame” of Iran’s most 
prominent detractors, which would guarantee that many generations of Iranians 
will come of age under a relatively stable government.  (26) If Iran is able to 
reverse its economic course and better use its vast oil wealth, it is likely that it will 
return to its role as the “fulcrum in the Gulf” and additionally play a stronger role 
in Central Asia. (27) 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
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GEORGIA 
Saakashvili declares economy top priority and names (another) prime 
minister 
President Mikheil Saakashvili delivered his annual state of the nation address on 
12 February. In it, he announced that his priority was addressing unemployment 
and the Georgian economy. He stressed the necessity of maintaining political 
stability in order to implement his economic plans successfully. Saakashvili said 
his government would focus on three areas: First, it would use foreign aid to 
generate jobs. Second, Saakashvili promised a 2.2 billion lari ($1.3 billion) 
economic stimulus program that would create an additional 25,000 jobs through 
infrastructure projects. Third, the president’s administration would implement a 
long term strategy to attract foreign investment. (1) Saakashvili also discussed 
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plans to reform the healthcare system, to give each internally displaced person 
(IDP) or family a half hectare of land, to raise pensions, and to increase teachers’ 
salaries. (2) 
 
Saakashvili’s latest prime minister, Nika Gilauri, was confirmed at the beginning 
of February. Gilauri replaces former ambassador to Turkey Grigol Mgalobishvili, 
who resigned the prime minister’s post, citing health concerns. Gilauri held the 
post of Energy Minister from 2004-2007, after which he served as Finance 
Minister until 2009. In his role as Finance Minister he was one of the architects of 
the economic stimulus package formally introduced in January. In keeping with 
Saakashvili’s emphasis on the economy, one of the president’s first instructions 
to his new prime minister was to reduce administrative costs by 10%. (3) 
 
In addition to reductions in Georgia’s domestic revenues, overseas remittances 
to Georgia fell sharply in January, with Georgia’s National Bank announcing a 
12.5% decline compared to the same time last year. (4) It is the first such decline 
since 2001. Experts attribute the decrease to the effect of the global economic 
crisis on Russia. (5) Georgia receives a high percentage of its remittances from 
Georgian workers living in Russia.  
 
CIS Peacekeeping Force out, Russian military in 
Amidst the geopolitical chaos that followed Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 
August, the all-Russian CIS Peacekeeping Force (CISPKF) left Abkhazia with 
little fanfare. According to the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 
(UNOMIG), CISPKF’s positions subsequently were claimed by Russian forces. 
(6) It is unclear whether the personnel manning the positions actually changed or 
whether the CISPKF simply reverted to its role as part of the Russian military. 
 
Within Abkhazia, the Gali district, the only remaining part of the separatist 
republic populated by a Georgian majority after the invasion of the Kodori Gorge, 
remains a trouble spot. The Abkhaz authorities formally have restricted 
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movement across the ceasefire line since July 2008, except for medical 
emergencies. (7) They also have destroyed pedestrian bridges. These closures 
have led to increased isolation for Georgian families whose relatives live across 
the ceasefire line and higher bribes to corrupt border guards from those who 
decide to risk the crossing anyway. UNOMIG estimates that Russia now has one 
battalion stationed in the Georgian majority Gali district alone. (8) 
 
Russian forces are taking steps to entrench their position within Abkhazia. The 
Gudauta airbase is being reactivated. According to Russian sources, the base 
will now host 20 Russian planes, including Su-27 fighter jets, Su-25 Frogfoot 
planes and cargo aircraft. (9) Russia expects to invest 12.5 billion rubles ($344 
million) to refit the Gudauta base, which may house up to 3,700 Russian troops. 
(10) 
 
Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze has alleged that Russia already has 27 fighter 
jets stationed at Gudauta. (11) A spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry 
denied the claim, calling it “groundless.” (12) The Gudauta base formally was 
closed in 2001 as part of a 1999 OSCE agreement; however, in the words of a 
Foreign Ministry statement from that period, portions of the base would be “used 
in the interests of the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces for maintaining peace 
in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone." (13) Since the CIS peacekeeping forces 
consisted entirely of Russian military forces, the “closure” of the base was 
somewhat suspect. 
 
Russia also has announced plans to establish a naval base in Ochamchira on 
Abkhazia’s Black Sea coast. The new base site needs considerable work, with 
preparations for the naval base estimated to take at least a year, according to a 
Russian General Staff spokesperson. (14) 
 
Source Notes: 
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Water crisis ratchets up conflict potential in Tajikistan 
Roughly one year after being hit with a catastrophic energy shortage, Tajikistan’s 
citizens find themselves worse off than ever, with some regions once again 
enduring a total power blackout.  Electricity is being supplied to Dushanbe’s 
residents for four hours in the morning and seven hours in the evening, but 
inhabitants of Khatlon Province in the south are receiving no power at all.  
Residents of Tursunzoda also are on a strictly rationed electricity schedule and in 
early February, Talco, which operates the country’s aluminum plant (one of 
Tajikistan’s two largest sources of export revenue), was forced to cut production 
by ten percent.  (1)  The Nurek reservoir, which powers the country’s largest 
hydropower station, has not managed to take in enough water over the past year 
in order to meet the minimum level required for power generation, putting the 
hydropower plant at risk of breakdowns from overloading.  The Nurek station 
produces 70 percent of Tajikistan’s electricity. (2) 
 
An agreement brokered with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan last fall was 
supposed to bring sufficient Turkmen electrical power into Tajikistan in order to 
lower the demand on the Nurek plant long enough for water levels in the 
reservoir to return to at least the minimum required level (see ISCIP Analyst, Vol. 
XV, No. 3, 23 October 2008 for details about the agreement), however, in 
January of this year, the Uzbek government reneged on the deal, (3) due to a 
dispute over the amount of transit fees Dushanbe owes for the Turkmen 
electricity, (4) although Odinamahmad Chorshanbiev, a spokesman for 
Tajikistan’s state electric company, blamed the power outages on a malfunction 
at Uzbekistan’s Qaraqul substation. (5)  In place of the Turkmen power supply, 
the Kazakh government has been providing Tajikistan with roughly 1.5 million 
kilowatt hours of electricity on a daily basis since the beginning of February.  
Although the Kazakh power must also transit Uzbek territory, it is sent through a 
different transmission line and as of yet, there are no disagreements over transit 
costs for that line. (6)  One additional wrinkle in an already complicated situation 
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is the fact that Barqi Tojik, the state holding company that buys hydroelectric 
energy from the Sangtuda-1 plant and supplies it to residents and businesses, is 
in arrears to the hydropower station for approximately 16 million somoni (about 
US$4.3 million) for energy bought in 2008.  Sangtuda officials have filed a lawsuit 
against Barqi Tojik in order to recover the money, and Barqi Tojik, in turn, has 
requested a state loan to cover the debt.  Until the debt is paid, the completion of 
Sangtuda’s fourth electricity generating station, primarily financed by Russia, is in 
jeopardy. (7)  There is also a risk that Sangtuda temporarily might cease or 
reduce its power supply to Barqi Tojik, as a way of persuading state officials to 
step up the payment process. 
 
With the Kyrgyz government facing very similar water and energy shortages and 
the spring planting season drawing near, Central Asia is moving ever closer to an 
all-out water crisis and at this point, there seems to be little or nothing that either 
its neighbor states or the international community can do to avoid it.  Perhaps 
due to the desperation of the situation, investment aid is at long last starting to 
trickle into Tajikistan, but it is likely too late to bring any relief for this year – no 
amount of investment dollars will be able to conjure up water out of thin air.  
Managing the supply that still exists in a fair and equitable fashion is the Central 
Asian states’ best hope, but even assuming that they are able to reach and 
adhere to an agreement, large numbers of each country’s citizens will be 
shortchanged on electricity supplies and/or irrigation water. 
 
The Tajik government received good news earlier this month, when Iran’s 
ambassador to Tajikistan, Ali Asghar Sherdust, informed journalists of his 
country’s decision to take part in the completion of the Roghun hydroelectric 
power station, a construction project which has been languishing since at least 
the late 1980s.  A Russian company, RUSAL, briefly was granted a contract for 
the Roghun station’s completion, but then was shut out when it failed to meet the 
Tajik President Emomali Rahmon’s expectations (please see The ISCIP Analyst, 
Vol. XIV, No. 13, 19 June 2008 for more details).  Since RUSAL’s ouster, 
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President Rahmon has been courting the Iranian and Russian governments 
vigorously, hoping one or both would agree to take on the project and on 
February 5 his wish finally was granted.  According to the agreement signed by 
Rahmon and Iranian Minister of Commerce Masud Mir-Kazemi, Iran will 
participate in a consortium to finish the Roghun station’s construction, (8) but a 
completion date has not been made public. 
 
Iran’s decision to help underwrite Roghun comes at a very interesting time, just 
weeks after Russian President Dmitri Medvedev made a statement in Tashkent 
that clearly seemed to indicate Russia’s support for Uzbekistan’s position in the 
water conflict.  In a meeting with Uzbek President Islom Karimov, Medvedev 
declared: “Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian region must be built 
with consideration of the interests of all neighbouring states… if there is no 
common accord of all parties, Russia will refrain from participation in such 
projects.” The Russian and Uzbek presidents then put forth a joint communiqué 
stating: “The parties have agreed with the need to consider the interests of all 
states located on trans-boundary water currents of the Central Asian region in 
implementing projects for building hydroelectric power structures on them, guided 
by generally accepted standard of international law.” 
 
Tajikistan’s foreign minister promptly responded by lodging a formal complaint 
with the Russian embassy (9) and several days later Tajik deputy minister of 
energy and industry, Pulod Muhiddinov, unequivocally stated that his government 
would move ahead with its plans to finish building the Roghun hydropower 
station. (10)  Iran’s announcement that it would join the Roghun consortium came 
several days after Muhiddinov’s declaration.  Russia’s president also has 
expressed interest in investing in the Roghun project; thus, Iran’s participation is 
not necessarily a sign of rivalry, but may provide the two regimes with just one 
more avenue for cooperation. 
 
 45 
Upon returning to Moscow, Medvedev lost little time in reversing his position vis à 
vis Kyrgyzstan, when he offered President Kurmanbek Bakiev enough Russian 
investment to complete one of Kyrgyzstan’s largest hydroelectric stations.  
Medvedev’s words and subsequent actions undoubtedly sent very disturbing 
signals to Dushanbe – namely, that Russia is willing to champion Kyrgyzstan’s 
cause, in spite of the Uzbek government’s objections (as an upstream country, 
Uzbekistan does not wish to see additional dams and hydropower stations built in 
either Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan), but Tajikistan is on its own and at the mercy of 
upstream countries Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  Relations between Tashkent 
and Dushanbe seemed to thaw just a bit yesterday, when the Tajik-Uzbek joint 
commission on trade and economic cooperation was able to reach an agreement 
on the schedule for water discharge from Tajikistan’s Qaraqul reservoir, the 
source for much of Tajikistan’s hydroelectric power, as well as for irrigation water 
needed by Uzbekistan.  The two sides also were able to come to terms on a 
repayment schedule for a US$16 million debt owed to Uztransgaz (Uzbek state 
gas transportation agency) by Tojiktransgaz (Tajik state gas transportation 
agency). (11)  This debt has been a sore point between the two states for years 
and has resulted in the shutoff of natural gas supplies to Tajikistan nearly every 
winter over the past decade. 
 
Perhaps the severity of the water crisis finally has succeeded in creating a truce 
between the two states, but nothing is sure yet.  After all, the agreements signed 
as a result of last October’s “water summit” between representatives of all five 
Central Asian states lasted mere months before the Uzbek government 
unilaterally broke them.  Should Tashkent renege on its promises yet again, the 
only method of retaliation available to President Rahmon is to withhold water, a 
solution that could backfire with devastating consequences both for himself and 
his country.  Rahmon never has enjoyed more than lukewarm support from 
President Karimov’s administration and at times, the two men have appeared to 
be arch enemies.   It is virtually certain that in the late 1990s, Uzbekistan aided 
and abetted in at least one coup attempt against Rahmon, and Karimov has 
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shown little concrete support for his counterpart since then, chastising him on 
more than one occasion for failing to show sufficient gratitude and respect to the 
Uzbek president.  Now that the Russia openly has declared its support for 
Uzbekistan in regard to the water crisis, Karimov may feel that he has been 
granted a free hand to retaliate in whatever manner he sees fit, should the Tajik 
government attempt to exert pressure on Uzbekistan by reducing the water flow, 
including forcing a regime change in Dushanbe. 
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UKRAINE 
Ukraine teeters on the edge; Does Yushchenko notice? 
It’s been a busy few weeks for Ukraine President Viktor Yushchenko. First, 
Yushchenko and his allies urged the Prosecutor-General to investigate Prime 
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko for allegedly violating Ukraine’s national security 
when she signed a gas contract with Russia.  Then, in quick succession, 
Yushchenko’s allies asked the security services to examine the gas deal, 
supported an unsuccessful vote of no-confidence in Tymoshenko’s cabinet, and 
asked the court to find the cabinet’s formation unconstitutional.  (1) 
 
Finally, the Foreign Ministry, which reports to Yushchenko, sent an official 
“circular” to 31 international diplomatic missions (including the EU, US, and 
Russia) instructing the heads of missions to inform “officials in the host country at 
the highest possible level” that Tymoshenko’s actions have been “unscrupulous 
and inadequate.” (2) 
 
The Ministry has not confirmed whether Ukraine's Ambassador to the US phoned 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with this urgent and vital news. 
 
The president’s office was forced to backtrack, however, on its plan to support an 
investigation by various security branches of Tymoshenko’s “role” in the gas 
contract.  
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On 16 January, Deputy Presidential Chief-of-Staff Roman Bezsmertny said, "The 
main results of [Tymoshenko’s] actions are the severance of strategically 
important long-term contracts on supplies of natural gas to Ukraine, a dramatic 
increase in the price for natural gas, and the threat of the Ukrainian gas 
transportation system's loss.”  In an official statement on the president’s website, 
Bezsmertny further suggested that the Prosecutor General (a Yushchenko 
appointee) should investigate the prime minister, since "one may wonder whether 
these actions were deliberate or non-deliberate” and since her actions “threaten 
Ukraine’s national security.” (3) 
 
This statement received an extremely negative response in Ukraine’s media, as 
well as internationally.  It disappeared from the presidential website within twelve 
hours, and Yushchenko was forced to affirm to Ukraine’s international allies that 
the country would honor the deal. 
 
It is clear, however, that none of these actions by Yushchenko are intended to 
mitigate the massive economic crisis hitting the country.  In fact, the impression 
of chaos and confusion created by constant attacks on the government—and the 
government’s resulting siege mentality and hardening of positions—has shaken 
the will of international organizations to assist Ukraine through this crisis.  
 
The International Monetary Fund recently postponed the disbursement of the 
second tranche of an agreed $16.4 billion emergency loan.  The tranche is worth 
$1.9 billion.  A spokesman for the IMF cited “the need to find agreement on how 
to contain the general government deficit in 2009.”  (4)  
 
In exchange for the loan, Ukraine’s government agreed to maintain a deficit of 
less than one percent of GDP.  Since then, the country’s currency has declined 
over 30 percent (to a total depreciation of around 60 percent) and industrial 
production has plummeted.  The government has responded by suggesting an 
economic stimulus package based on public works spending, while refusing to 
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eliminate planned cost-of-living increases in wages and pensions.  The 2009 
budget, therefore, foresees a deficit of around three percent, and the government 
has requested a revised contract.  
 
The IMF spokesperson recently noted that the government’s figures do not 
include a projected 4.5 percent deficit that will be created based on a bank 
recapitalization program already agreed upon with the Fund.  Nevertheless, 
spokesperson David Hawley suggested that progress has been made in recent 
discussions, although further talks are necessary since “a few issues remain 
outstanding.”  (5) 
 
Battles with the IMF and between the cabinet and the president led last week to 
the resignation of Finance Minister Viktor Pynzenyk – a longtime proponent of 
balanced budgets and conservative fiscal management.  Pynzenyk has not 
spoken publicly about his resignation, except to suggest that his position had 
become too politicized.  
 
Throughout the most recent negotiations over the second tranche, Yushchenko 
repeatedly criticized the government.  In particular, the president’s press office 
released a quote from IMF European Department Director Marek Belka 
suggesting there were “serious problems” in the implementation of the IMF 
program. (6)  Belka has not confirmed or denied this quote, which was released 
as part of a Yushchenko press release following a private meeting.  
 
On the same day, IMF mission representatives were due to meet with the prime 
minister about their concerns.  Instead, the prime minister and her cabinet were 
called into parliament to face a no-confidence vote.  This vote received the 
backing of Yushchenko’s allies in the “United Center” party.  IMF representatives 
spent the day waiting as the entire cabinet sat inside the parliament chamber 
listening to debate, reporting, answering questions and waiting for the results of 
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the vote.  Eventually, the government won with a comfortable margin (203 in 
favor out of 450 members). (7) 
 
All of this has caused some of President Yushchenko’s former allies to wonder 
aloud about the reasoning behind Yushchenko’s decision-making.  “What is 
happening right now is irrational,” said Oleh Rybachuk, the president’s right-
hand-man during the Orange Revolution and his first chief-of-staff, commenting 
in the Kyiv Post.  But Oleksiy Haran, based at the former Yushchenko stronghold 
of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, disagreed.  “Yushchenko chose a clear strategy of 
trying to flunk governments,” he said.  (8) 
 
Regardless of the reason, diplomats and international organizations complain 
that the country appears rudderless, unprofessional and unprepared to integrate 
into Western structures.  More often than not, the majority of the blame for this is 
placed at the feet of Yushchenko, who is seen as a modern-day, less-dangerous 
Nero.   
 
Were Yushchenko and Tymoshenko to work together, there is little doubt they 
would be more successful in molding a strong, pragmatic budget and economic 
stimulus strategy.  After all, countries throughout the world are grappling with 
burgeoning budget deficits and rapidly shifting budget plans.  But, even in the 
face of such a harsh crisis, unity seems unlikely, particularly given the president’s 
response to the gas deal.  While most of Yushchenko’s former Orange 
Revolution allies rallied around the government during and following its 
negotiations with Russia over a new gas contract, Yushchenko lashed out.  None 
expect this crisis to be any different. The loser will be Ukraine. 
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